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Please note that the presentations are not exactly as given orally to the Hearing. They are the written notes provided to Al Rycroft by the participants.
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My name is Al Rycroft, and I live on Salt Spring Island, British Columbia, near the transit route of nuclear ships.
I have been very concerned about nuclear ships since 1981. Having worked full-time for nine years opposing them, there is much I would like to say. But I will try to restrict myself to the 15-minute guideline.
Refused permission to represent me here today, is my Counsel, Victoria lawyer Andrew Gage. I trust the hearing will take the opportunity to listen to my lawyer soon.
From 1989 to 1995 I was a lead campaigner against nuclear ships in BC. During this period, little Victoria had up to 15,000 people walking for peace and opposing nuclear ships-- an impressive eight percent of the local population.
The vote against nuclear ships was a rare 51:1 in the BC Legislature. I was in the gallery listening, as all three parties declared British Columbia a nuclear-weapons free province, and called on the Federal Government to hold a full, public environmental review of nuclear ship visits.
Votes in eight of ten local municipal councils also called on the Federal Government to hold a public review. In seven of the municipalities, the votes were unanimous. All local Members of Parliament also got involved, and wrote letters to the Federal Government calling for a public review.
The Federal Government completely ignored this overwhelming display of political agreement. This strong anti-nuclear sentiment continues to cut across all political stripes in BC today- and continues to be ignored by the Federal Government.
The Government has always claimed that nuclear warship visits are perfectly safe. However, when given an opportunity to prove it, the Canadian Government chose instead to go to court. They fought the VIP Society all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada to avoid an independent, public inquiry into nuclear ship visits.
I submit that the Canadian Government is neither serving the will of the Canadian people, or British Columbians, by allowing nuclear ship visits to continue on the West Coast of Canada.
In fact, the Federal Government is exposing millions of Canadians to the unacceptable risk of a nuclear accident. An accident which is 100% preventable by banning nuclear ships-- not just to Nanoose, but all Canadian waters and ports.
In June and July this year alone, the Juan de Fuca and Georgia Strait have been visited four times by nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable ships: the USS Charlotte, USS Salt Lake City, USS Houston, and the USS Stinson.
According to the Base Commander at Nanoose, over 75% of the activity is by the US.
Many of the tests are of nuclear weapons systems. No one is blowing up warheads here, but the US is testing weapons systems whose "payloads" are nuclear warheads.
Several years ago I paid a brief visit to the Nanoose Base. When I asked if I could take a tour, the man at the gate told me no, that they didn't give tours to the public. "Besides," he added, "the Americans aren't in, so nothing much is happening." He went on to explain that the Base was in reality controlled out of Washington, even if it was a Canadian base on paper.
I will briefly outline my legal concerns, without the aid of counsel. I want the record to note that I object to the silencing of either myself or my lawyer in this hearing. Both of us should have the right to speak.
On July 8, 1996, the threat or use of nuclear weapons was outlawed by the International Court of Justice. I suspect that any impartial application of international law would find that many of the tests at Nanoose are now illegal preparations for using nuclear weapons.
When I was a Director, the VIP Society prosecuted a lawsuit against the Federal Government, attempting to strike two key Cabinet Orders that allow nuclear ships into Canada. Approximately 800 pages of expert testimony were filed covering public safety, environment, health, and public opinion concerning nuclear ships.
Your study of these affidavits, would shed much light on the dangers of the nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors operated by foreign military in BC waters.
I now formally request from the Hearing full photocopy and delivery costs for three copies of these affidavits. The cost is estimated at $250. Will I be reimbursed?
Mr. Goldie's Answer: Your lawyer will have to convince me of the value of these documents.
On Friday, July 16 at four pm, the Hearing Registrar faxed me: "If you speak on your own behalf counsel will not be heard other than to introduce you and advise you."
In other words, I can speak for 15 minutes myself, but have no opportunity to professionally question procedural matters, introduce international law, or other legal matters that concern me. Or alternately, you can hear the legal arguments of my lawyer, but only second-hand of my expert opinions.
I would like the record to note that I object to the following:
I am requesting of you, that my lawyer Andrew Gage be given the first-available opportunity to address procedural questions about this hearing, and that his time be appropriately reimbursed by the Government of Canada.
I also request that my lawyer be given an opportunity to present other legal arguments pertaining to the proposed expropriation of 225-square kilometers of British Columbia seabed, during the course of these hearings.
Can I have an answer today, or very soon, on proper legal representation for myself?
Mr. Goldie's Answer: [after lengthy debate] Yes. Your lawyer may represent your legal concerns to the Hearing at another time.
How in a democracy, can an expropriation be completed so quickly, when there is no immediate and compelling need for nuclear ships to be in British Columbia; when a real and present danger is posed by naval nuclear systems; and when such overwhelming and longstanding opposition exists to their presence?
These are some of the legal issues I believe need to be addressed by my lawyer in this hearing.
The military and the government assure us that they are, and that the US nuclear navy has a tremendous safety record. But I witnessed the same Canadian Government go to the Supreme Court of Canada to avoid any independent assessment of the potential risks of nuclear ships to our health and the environment.
The VIP Society's lawsuit demonstrated that when a nuclear warship is in Canadian waters, all Canadian laws are suspended. In my opinion, this is an extension of "diplomatic immunity" inappropriate for a democracy.
Thus the accident-prone USS Nimitz failed to report a three-kilometer long slick of jet fuel it leaked between Vancouver Island and the Mainland. The leak was spotted from a plane.
If the US military's attitude is so cavalier concerning petrochemical leaks, imagine their silence when the leak is nuclear-- and invisible.
The truth is, it is also the US government's policy to not release nuclear accident information even to host countries. When there is an accident, Canadian authorities will not be informed.
As BC author Kim Goldberg wrote in her 1991 book, "Submarine Dead Ahead":
"The US Department of Defense directive 5230.16 conveniently permits the US Navy or other government representatives to deny or conceal a nuclear weapon accident: 'Unified Commanders... may confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear weapon components at the scene of an accident or significant incident.' "
The insurance industry is also extremely wary of nuclear risks. They refuse to underwrite them. Every Canadian and American insurance policy has a legislated nuclear exemption clause which eliminates insurance coverage in the case of a nuclear accident or war. Mine reads, in part, "This policy does not cover... loss or damage caused by contamination by radioactive material."
University of California Professor Jackson Davis, did a study in 1987 of two plausible nuclear accident scenarios in Victoria and Esquimalt. I quote from the Executive Summary:
"The first accident scenario analyzed is incineration of a single nuclear warhead in a ship-board fire. Such an accident would produce a radioactive cloud containing plutonium-239, which would be carried toward the northeast, directly over Esquimalt/Victoria, by the most probable prevailing winds... Under unfavorable meteorological conditions the effects of such an accident could be experienced as far away as Vancouver."
"The second accident scenario analyzed is a hypothetical nuclear-reactor accident aboard a ship berthed at Esquimalt..."
"Although short-term casualties under the generally conservative assumptions of this analysis are relatively low, both accidents modeled would cause from hundreds to thousands of long-term casualties unless the contaminated urban areas were both evacuated and decontaminated. Rapid evacuation would appear impossible in the absence of effective emergency response plans."
"The most significant impact, however, could be economic. U.S. Government studies indicate that decontamination could cost tens of billions of U.S. dollars and take months to complete, during which time the local economy would be largely terminated. These cost estimates omit the on-site costs of clean-up, and they omit "indirect" losses from the termination of local economies and ripple effects on provincial and national economies."
These costs are in 1987 US dollars, and do not take inflation into account.
Nuclear ships are a danger to millions of residents along the Juan de Fuca and Georgia Straits, and to the ecosystems along the transit route. This danger can be completely avoided by just saying, "No!"
When the anti-nuclear heat is on, the Federal Government traditionally says a "recent" study has confirmed that nuclear ships are safe. They promise this document will soon be released-- but the documents never make their way to the light. I know, I've tried to get them several times.
The one time the government did release a so-called "environmental" study of Nanoose, it neglected to examine the nuclear issue. A major "oversight" that renders the study inconclusive, misleading and highly suspect.
On nuclear and military matters, the government hides its activities behind a veil of secrecy. A veil that is in opposition to democratic governance, due public process, and the rights of taxpayers.
The Federal Government is afraid of public scrutiny.
This Hearing is about more than the proposed expropriation.
It is also about the illegality of nuclear weapons and many of the activities at the Nanoose test range.
And finally, this Hearing is about abuse of power by the Federal Government, in needlessly allowing hazardous nuclear ships into the ocean backyards of millions of British Columbians, against their will.
In the name of "security", under a veil of secrecy, we are all put at risk.
Mr. Goldie, I urge you to recommend to the Federal Government:
I encourage you to go beyond narrow confines, and give a full accounting of what you hear during these weeks.
I urge you to study the many affidavits I would like to deposit, for they speak clearly and authoritatively of the dangers of nuclear ship visits, and the longstanding public desire to ban these deadly ships from British Columbia waters and ports, including Nanoose.
The affidavits cover far more ground than is possible in a short, 15-minute presentation.
Finally, I urge you to address the irregularities in the expropriation and Hearing process. And to allow my counsel to properly represent my own personal legal rights, interests and concerns.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Thank you.
Respectfully Submitted,
Al Rycroft
Box 8307
VICTORIA BC V8W 3R9
(250) 592-8307 phone/fax
rycroft@SunshineCommunications.ca
www.SunshineCommunications.ca
In the Matter of the Expropriation Act, R.S. of Canada, 1985, c. E-21
and
In the Matter of a Notice of Intention to Expropriate all interests in
land, save and except for (a) all mines and minerals whether precious or
base and (b) all those natural resources that are set out in paragraph
50(1)(b) of the Land Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 245, in those lands in the
vicinity of Nanoose Bay
1. I am here representing the following objectors:
a) Meredith Dickman - Objector # 2405 - has lived in Nanaimo for the past 12 years. She and her children are now moving to Metchosin, but she continues to have close friends and strong ties to the Nanaimo area.
b) Michele Hansen lives in Mill Bay. She has family who live near the Nanoose area and filed her objections in part out of concern for them.
c) Ivy Jeffers is a retired woman living in Victoria with her husband. She has no direct legal interest in the proposed expropriation but has political and ethical concerns she wishes raised in these hearings.
d) Margaret Smythe is a retired woman of 75 years. He husband is in a nursing home and she was therefore unable to attend these hearings in person. She has no legal interest in the expropriation, but has moral concerns which prompted her to file her objection.
e) Alan Rycroft is a consultant based on Saltspring Island with a long-time involvement in the peace movement. You have already heard evidence and submissions from Mr. Rycroft on July 19, 1999 at which time I am advised that you gave him leave to have his legal counsel address these proceedings at a later date.
2. Of these objectors, Michele Hansen and Ivy Jeffers have given me additional written notes about points they would like to see raised in these hearings. I have tried to incorporate these comments into these submissions, as well as the oral instructions that I have received from the other objectors, but have also appended these written statements in their entirety to these submissions.
3. This hearing takes place under the Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-21 (the "Act"). The result of this hearing will be a report by the Hearing Officer which the Minister may consider in deciding whether or not to proceed with the proposed expropriation.
4. The hearing was called under section 10(1) of the Act, which provides that where individuals have sent a written objection to the Minister regarding a proposed expropriation, the Minister shall "order that a public hearing be conducted with respect to the objection and any other objection to the intended expropriation that has been or may be served on the Minister."
5. Further direction as to the scope of the Hearing may be found in section 10(4)(b) which states that the Hearing Officer must seek to "report to the Minister on the nature and grounds of the objections."
6. There is no requirement that an objector have a proprietary or other legal interest in the intended expropriation, although the objector is required to state what interest, if any, the objector may have in the expropriation (s. 9). This wide scope stands in sharp contrast to later sections of the Act which refer only to "persons then appearing to have any right, estate or interest in the land." (s. 16(1)).
7. On receiving the report from this Hearing the Minister will have to decide, after considering the report, whether to proceed with the expropriation or not (s. 11).
8. A determination of whether or not to proceed with section 11 requires the broadest consideration of public policy, taking into account a wide range of political, ethical, legal, and public policy issues.
9. It is therefore submitted that the Hearing Officer's jurisdiction is exceptionally broad. The report must faithfully and accurately convey any objections -- whether political, ethical, legal or other -- which might impact on the Minister's decision about whether or not to proceed with the expropriation.
10. I have reviewed the comments made by the Hearing Officer in his Notes for Opening at Nanaimo -- 19 July, 1999 (the "Notes"), and have a number of submissions regarding the Hearing Officer's comments on his jurisdiction.
11. It is suggested in paragraph 7 that the Hearing Officer has no jurisdiction to "decide the merits or validity of this expropriation." I agree that the Hearing Officer's role is to report the objections to the Minister, who has the power to make determinations as to the validity of the objections. However, there is no indication in the Act that the Hearing Officer may not make recommendations as to matters arising from the objections, particularly as regards to legal matters.
12. In my submission the interpretation taken by the Hearing Officer in paragraph 17, as to restrictions on the service of an objection, is unduly restrictive and is incorrect in law. However, as none of my clients appear to be affected by the ruling, I will leave the matter at that, unless the Hearing Officer wishes to hear my reasons for this submission.
13. In Paragraph 20 the Hearing Officer states that "the purpose of this part of the expropriation process is to enable the Minister to fine tune the intended expropriation." While this is part of the purpose of these Hearings, as discussed above an important purpose is to allow the Minister to determine whether to proceed at all with the expropriation.
14. I am further advised that the Hearing Officer has stated during these proceedings that proof of these grounds are irrelevant. With respect, this seems overly restrictive. While the emphasis of the report must be in reporting accurately the objections raised, an individual's objections will clearly be shaped and defined by the information that the individual has access to. The "nature and grounds" of objections may be better understood by reference to the evidence on which the objection is based.
15. Unless some regard is given to the evidence, the objection that "there is a risk to human health" makes no more nor less sense than the objection that "aliens told me that they own the seabed." Evidence is what makes one of these objections constructive and valid.
16. To be useful to the Minister in making a determination under section 11, the report should not merely contain a brief summary of objections which may or may not have any validity. Where supporting evidence is given it should be included in at least a summary form so that the Minister has an opportunity to make a determination. In my submission the Hearing Officer's role is an information-gathering one, and that information includes a consideration of evidence.
17. To summarize, in my submission, the Hearing Officer has a wide jurisdiction to report to the Minister about objections relating to political, ethical, legal and other considerations. The Officer should also summarize evidence where it may help the Minister to understand and assess the nature and grounds of the objections. Indeed, to restrict this Hearing would deprive the Minister of the benefit of valuable information which the Minister should consider in making the decision of whether to proceed with the expropriation or not.
18. I understand from Alan Rycroft that, at his presentation on July 19, 1999 he enquired of the Hearing Officer about the appropriateness of introducing some 800 pages of affidavit materials ( the "Affidavits") filed in Vancouver Island Peace Society et al. v. Canada, (the "VIPS Case") a court case which Mr. Rycroft was involved as a director of the Vancouver Island Peace Society.
19. I further understand that the Hearing Officer indicated that if I, as Mr. Rycroft's legal counsel, could convince him that these affidavits were relevant, that he would receive them.
20. The VIPS Case challenged a decision by the Canadian Government to exempt the practice of having nuclear weapons capable and nuclear powered ships from entering Canadian harbours from an Environmental Impact Assessment.
21. The Affidavits were sworn by some 37 individuals, and address a wide range of issues raised by the lawsuit. As such, there are different reasons that different individual affidavits are relevant.
22. A number of the affidavits are relevant primarily as an indication of the level of public interest and concern about the visits of nuclear weapons capable and nuclear powered ships to Canadian ports.
23. Other affidavits provide expert evidence and/or other specific expertise as to the public safety and other policy issues around the presence of nuclear vessels in Canadian ports. They include affidavits by scientists with considerable expertise in nuclear safety, former military personnel with knowledge of the presence and handling of nuclear weapons on board ships, long time observers of nuclear vessel visits and arising political issues, and various other experts. These documents are not specifically tied to the facts of the VIPS Case, and are clearly relevant to the complex policy issues which should be the subject of your report. I will refer to some of them in these submissions.
24. Nanoose Bay has, for a number of years, been used as a site for testing torpedoes and other underwater weaponry. The seabed of the bay is shallow and sandy (but not muddy) which allows for the easy retrieval of torpedoes. The facility, known as the Canadian Forces Marine Experimental Testing Range ("CFMETR"), is used by Canada and its NATO allies, including the U.S. and U.K.
25. On the seabed of Nanoose the department of National Defence has installed a number of monitors and sensing devices for use in testing the facility. Under the Constitution Act, 1867 the Province of British Columbia has control and jurisdiction over the seabed of inland seas, including of Nanoose Bay.
26. The Federal Government sought and received permission from the Government of British Columbia to install and operate the necessary monitoring devices in the bed of Nanoose Bay, in the form of a 30 year lease, which expires this year.
27. Citizens groups have expressed considerable concern about the possible environmental, public safety, strategic and other impacts of the presence of U.S. and U.K. nuclear weapons and nuclear powered vessels at Nanoose and in other Canadian ports generally. Their actions resulted in the legislature of B.C. passing a declaration making B.C. a nuclear weapons free zone.
28. Negotiations towards an extended lease resulted in an Agreement in Principle between the Federal and Provincial Governments (the "Agreement"), but negotiations subsequently broke down.
29. According to the Federal Government, the negotiations broke down primarily due to the attempts of the Government of B.C. to use the threat of non-renewal of the lease as leverage in a dispute with the United States over salmon. The Provincial Government, by contrast, maintains that negotiations broke down when the Federal Government backed out of a commitment in the Agreement to prohibit the presence of nuclear warheads within the licence area. (Clause 7 of the Agreement).
30. After the breakdown of negotiations, the Minister filed a Notice of Intention to expropriate the seabed of Nanoose Bay, thereby the first step towards the proposed expropriation which is the subject of this Hearing.
31. Nuclear safety, both to humans and the environment, is obviously at the forefront of many of the Objectors appearing before you, and is certainly a major concern for all of my clients. As Michele Hansen wrote: Accidents do happen. When the American fleet has their nuclear accident what will happen to B.C.'s three main industries - fishing, logging and tourism? ... The disaster would be of phenomenal proportions. For the safety of all human and animal inhabitants of the island this range must be closed.
32. As I have pointed out above, it is within the Hearing Officer's jurisdiction to report on objections as to the "public work or other public purpose" for which the expropriation is required -- in this case the continued operation of CFMETR. However, it is also important to consider the reason that expropriation is being pursued over negotiations -- which may indeed be the opposition of the Provincial Government (as representatives of the people of B.C.) to the presence of nuclear weapons at the Nanoose testing range. The question of nuclear safety applies to both issues.
33. It should be noted that the American government does not confirm nor deny that the ships visiting CFMETR have nuclear weapons on board. However, evidence from former military personnel and others indicate that nuclear weapons are routinely kept on nuclear capable ships entering Canadian waters: Affidavit of Jason Miller, filed February 12, 1992 [All Affidavits referred to were filed in the VIPS case]
34. It is a matter of record that accidents involving nuclear weapons and nuclear vessels have happened, although it is official U.S. policy to deny that such accidents have occurred. Dr. Frederick Knelman, a Physicist with extensive background in nuclear safety, has stated:
THAT given the posture of infallibility, the policy of denial, and the umbrella of secrecy, it is very difficult to obtain accurate data on accidents involving nuclear weapons or nuclear military propulsion systems. The U.S. Department of Defence has confirmed some 32 accidents (U.S.D.D., 1981). However, a document obtained by the American Friends Service Committee utilizing the Freedom of Information Act (FIA) in 1986, provided evidence of 381 U.S. Navy nuclear accidents and incidents in a 12 year period, 1965-1977 (Paul Brink, 1986). This is an interesting disclosure, since it suggests that the rate of such events is about 30 per year for the United States alone. [Affidavit of Fred Knelman, filed November 22, 1991, para. 8]
Dr. Knelman then goes on to review a series of studies and reports documenting more than 1,200 naval accidents involving nuclear weapons, power or materials which have occurred over 40 years in shipyards, ports, coastal waters and the high seas.
35. Medical experts have commented on the possible public health consequences of a major action on board a nuclear powered accident. In the VIPS case Dr. Jan Christilaw, Chief of Obstetrics at the Peach Arch District Hospital, filed an affidavit detailing possible medical effects, which she believes could be extremely serious. She concludes, that "although the probability of an accident on a nuclear ship may be small, that the possible consequences are so devastating that the resultant risk is unacceptable." [Filed February 11, 1992]
36. The Federal Government has passed two Orders in Council specifically exempting the visits of nuclear powered and capable ships to Canadian ports from an environmental assessment under the Canadian Environment Act. This was done despite a recommendation that such a review be done from officials in the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. [Affidavit of John Brewin, filed April 3, 1992]
37. In addition to the potential for accident, it is worth noting that the presence of nuclear powered and capable ships at Nanoose makes Nanoose a potential target in the event of a war or a terrorist attack. The potentially disastrous effect of the release of radioactive materials, or a more serious incident, need not arise accidentally.
38. To the extent that the Nanoose seabed is being expropriated to allow for the presence of nuclear weapons within the testing area, it is our submission that this purpose is contrary to the public interest, posing a grave risk to human health and the local environment, and we ask the Minister to reconsider his opinion on this point.
Federal Interference with Provincial Authority
39. A number of my clients feel strongly that the proposed expropriation as an unwarranted interference in Provincial matters, and an ugly precedent which could result in further expropriations of provincial property. As Mrs. Ivy Jeffers puts it in her letter of objection:
2. The move denies the province's right not only to govern its provincial territory but even to possess its own territory.
3. Paternalism is not written into our repatriated constitution; wasn't that sort of dependence and interference the whole idea behind the (then Liberal) government's bringing home of the constitution?
40. Obviously this objection has significant political ramifications. Two of the clients specifically noted that this would never occur in Ontario or Quebec. The public backlash against such an act would be unbelievable. Even here, the proposed expropriation may have far-reaching political consequences. As Mrs. Jeffers writes:
Western separatism does exist, and will increase with this high-handed move, which is perceived by B.C. citizens as punishment for "acting up" by using control of our own property to safeguard our own interests. Further alienation will follow, and the Cascadia idea will gain more support.
41. However, this objection also has legal significance as well. The Constitution Act, 1867 represents a careful balancing and allocation of sovereign powers between the federal and provincial governments, and the courts have always been protective of attempts by the federal government to usurp provincial roles.
42. The constitutional difficulties involved in allowing the federal government to expropriate provincial lands has been recognized for some time. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada commented on the difficulties, in the 1929 Re Water Powers' Reference, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 481 at 484 (S.C.C.):
... neither the Dominion nor a Province can take possession of a source of revenue which has been assigned to the other, and as a source of revenue, appropriate it to itself, nor, as owner, transfer it to another.
This, of course, is not to say that the Dominion in exercising its legislative authority under s. 91, may not legislate in such a way as to affect the proprietary rights of a Province. It is plain that in consequence of legislation on the subject, for example, of fisheries, the Provinces may be very greatly restricted in the exercise of their proprietary rights...
43. If the reasoning in Re Water Powers' Reference applies, the Federal Government might be able to legislate in respect of the sea bed at Nanoose, perhaps authorizing the sensing devices and monitoring and preventing Provincial interference in CFMETR; however, the ownership of the seabed would remain with the Province. The regulation of the Nanoose Seabed would not fall within the Expropriation Act and would have to be carried out through a new federal statute, if at all.
44. It may be that the Federal Government does have jurisdiction to expropriate provincial Crown Lands, despite the reasoning of the Reference, by virtue of s. 117 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provides for provinces to hold their own lands "subject to the Right of Canada to assume any Lands or Public Property required for Fortifications or for the Defence of the Country." However, even if that is the case, it is submitted that reference should be made to Re Water Powers' Reference to regarding the serious issues involved in an expropriation of provincial Crown land.
45. Even where the Federal Government seeks to merely make use of provincial lands (as opposed to claiming to expropriate it entirely) the Re Water Powers' Reference decision cautions that whether such a power exists will depend largely on the context of the section 91 power being relied upon, as well as the circumstances of the use:
There is no general formula for deciding whether or not, in respect of any such given purpose, the nature of the Dominion authority imports the existence of such a right [to override the proprietary rights of the Provinces]. That can only be determined after an examination of the nature of the purpose, the character of the power invoked and the character of the means proposed to be employed in order to effectuate the purpose. [at p. 494]
46. While it may well be that in the right circumstances the broad powers of the Federal Government under section 117 would be sufficient to allow the Federal Government to infringe on provincial property rights, we submit that the efforts of the Federal Government to negotiate with the Province would be a relevant consideration in determining whether the Federal Government can so limit provincial rights.
47. We submit that this extraordinary power to infringe on the constitutionally allocated powers of the Province should, as a matter of both law and policy, only be used in the clearest and most necessary cases. The Federal Government should exhibit the highest standard of good faith and reasonableness, and the taking should be in direct proportion to the purpose for which it is required.
48. A number of my clients object to the fact that an Agreement in Principle was reached and the Federal Government now apparently wishes to back out of the Agreement. Meredith Dickman's appraisal of the situation (from her letter of objection) is:
The renewal of the lease agreement with the United States for use of the bay as a testing station has been under negotiations by three parties, the governments of Canada and the U.S. and British Columbia as owner of the seabed and foreshore of Nanoose Bay. Negotiators for Canada and B.C. agreed to a statement of principles which endorsed the keeping of the site free of nuclear weapons. Now B.C. is being threatened with expropriation of the seabed apparently bowing to pressure by the U.S. Pentagon. This is an affront and a danger to the people of B.C. and to the sovereignty of Canada.
49. The Agreement in Principle appears to be a relatively complete document, with relatively few details needing to be filled in to create the final document. If the Federal Government is, as alleged by the Province and by my clients, attempting to expropriate the Nanoose seabed in order to side-step an agreement which it reached, this would surely be evidence of bad faith and an improper use of the Expropriation Act.
50. The Federal Government claims that the negotiations with British Columbia broke down because of an attempt by British Columbia to use the lease renewal as leverage in the recent dispute with the U.S. over salmon. There is no doubt that such an attempt was made -- Premier Glen Clark stated that there would be no new lease until there was a new Pacific Salmon Treaty.
51. Whatever the actual effect on the negotiations of Premier Clark's threat at the time, the fact remains that a Pacific Salmon Treaty has since been signed between Canada and the U.S. While British Columbia apparently had some concerns about the content of that Treaty there is no suggestion that disagreements with the U.S. over Salmon continue to act as a barrier to a negotiated lease.
52. Should the Federal Government proceed with the expropriation without a further bona fide attempt to negotiate a lease based upon the Agreement in Principle, this would represent strong evidence that the Federal Government is seeking to by-pass the Agreement and/or to punish British Columbia for interference in negotiations with the U.S. Either purpose represents a lack of good faith.
53. As noted above, the Federal Government should only engage in expropriation against a provincial government only in the clearest cases, and should demonstrated the highest bona fides. We submit that the Federal Government should seek to reopen negotiations with British Columbia to develop an acceptable lease based upon the Agreement.
54. A number of my clients all saw this expropriation as an example of U.S. interference in Canadian and British Columbian affairs or of unjustified "appeasement" of the U.S. by the Government of Canada. Some of the clients saw any testing and training by the U.S. Military in Canadian waters as unacceptable:
I am a resident of Vancouver Island and furious that the Federal Government would even consider allowing the U.S. to continue their activities here. We are Canadians and want no part of U.S. Military, especially nuclear powered vessels in our waters. It is quite simple - they do not belong here. I urge them to test and train in their own waters!
It is time the Federal Government took a firm stand with the U.S. over this issue and listened to the citizens of this area who do not want our land and waters used in this way. [Letter of Objection of Michele Hansen]
55. There is legal authority for Canada to allow U.S. naval vessels into Canadian waters on whatever terms it feels are appropriate. However, the Minister would be well advised to take account the perception that the Federal Government is being weak or is unable to stand up to the interests of United States, even when those interests diverge from the interests of Canadians.
56. The Minister might also do well to note the apparent will of the people of British Columbia as represented by the resolution of the Legislature of British Columbia passed in 1992 declaring B.C. to be a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.
57. Some of my clients further object on the grounds that Nuclear Weapons are both unethical and illegal at international law as weapons of mass destruction. To the extent that CFMETR is used to develop torpedoes designed to carry a nuclear warhead and to train crews to use such weapons, Canada's actions are contributing to this immoral and illegal practice.
58. Although there is currently a debate in Canada as to the extent to which international law can be enforced domestically in Canada (without supporting legislation), it is clear that the Minister, as a member of the Government of Canada, will be accountable to the international community for a failure to abide by international law, and are therefore properly a ground which should be reported to the Minister.
59. At least one of my clients adopts and supports the submissions made by the Nanoose First Nation on the significance of Aboriginal rights and claims to the Nanoose area.
60. One of my clients has expressed doubts that the Expropriation Act extends to the expropriation of seabed.
61. This suggestion has some merit, as the Act empowers the Minister to expropriate a legal interest in "land". Land is defined in the Act as including: buildings, structures and other things in the nature of fixtures and mines and minerals whether precious or base, on, above or below the surface... [section 2]
62. To define the seabed of Nanoose as "land" does not accord with the ordinary use of the word "land".
63. There are at least two reasons that the Act should be interpreted strictly on this point. The first was discussed above -- an attempt to infringe on the constitutional authority of a province should be done explicitly and clearly.
64. The second is the basic rule of interpretation that where an individual's proprietary rights are affected, the statute should be interpreted narrowly.
65. In our submission, the Act, as it currently reads, is the wrong instrument with which to expropriate the Nanoose seabed.
66. My clients object to the proposed expropriation on moral, policy and legal grounds. These grounds include:
a) The presence of nuclear weapons and nuclear powered vessels in and around CFMETR poses a serious risk to the health of nearby communities and to the environment;
b) The proposed expropriation represents an affront to the people of British Columbia which would not be tolerated in Quebec or Ontario, and which will fuel political distrust of the Federal Government in British Columbia;
c) The constitutional nature of the proposed expropriation requires the government, both morally and legally, to proceed only in the clearest case, and with the strongest bona fides;
d) With the resolution of the salmon dispute with the United States, there is no reason that a new lease could not be negotiated provided that the Federal Government is willing to negotiate in good faith, in keeping with the commitments already made in the Agreement;
e) The willingness of the Canadian Government to expropriate the Nanoose Seabed for the apparent purpose of allowing the continued presence of nuclear weapons at Nanoose represents a choice to put American military policy ahead of the interests of British Columbians and amounts to a loss of Canadian sovereignty;
f) The Federal Government is ignoring the wishes of the people of British Columbia, as represented in the 1992 resolution making British Columbia a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone;
g) Canadian cooperation in the development of torpedo systems designed to carry nuclear warheads is unethical and contrary to International Law; and
h) the Expropriation Act does not clearly empower the expropriation of ocean floor.
67. While I recognise that the Hearing Officer can make no decisions of a legal nature, I submit that the report should include either the suggestion or the recommendation that the Minister may consider sending a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada as to the legality of proceeding with this expropriation at this time, in light of the apparent willingness of the Provincial Government to negotiate a lease, the serious constitutional issues and the limitations of the Expropriation Act, as well as such other grounds as other Objectors may bring forward.
68. I would further submit that at least some of the Affidavits should be accepted and reviewed, as well as such other evidence as various Objectors may bring forward, and that at least a summary of such evidence be included in your report.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
Andrew Gage
Legal Counsel to M. Dickman,
M. Hansen, I. Jeffers,
Margaret Smythe and Al
Rycroft
BC Environmental Network (Water-Caucus)
July 20, 1999
I am presenting today on behalf of the Water Caucus of the British Columbia Environmental Network and as a father and marine ecologist living on a gulf island a few kilometres from the lands subject of these proceedings.
The British Columbia Environmental Network is a province-wide coalition comprised of approximately 250 conservation groups with combined organizational memberships exceeding a quarter of million British Columbians. The Caucus members are dedicated to marine and aquatic species, habitat and water quality preservation, protection, and restoration while ensuring sustainable use of our coastal waters.
The Caucus emphatically opposes the federal expropriation of the Canadian Forces Maritime and Experimental Test Range (CFMETR) Nanoose Bay sea bed and foreshore. We fully support the province of British Columbia in its demand for an end to the use of our waters by vessels that may be carrying nuclear weapons. We support the points of principle that were agreed to by federal and provincial negotiators on May 5th and subsequently rejected by the federal government. We urge a return to these principles and immediate abandonment of the federal expropriation.
Additionally, we want an end to the use of the Strait of Georgia by nuclear-propelled vessels. We believe that the activities carried out at the Nanoose Bay range by the US Navy (and other foreign navies) poses a real and immediate danger to millions of British Columbians, as well as the ecology of the entire region.
The majority of British Columbians have made it abundantly clear over the years (and evident in recent polls) that they do not want nuclear ships in our waters and they see the use of Georgia Strait by these vessels as unlawful and unconstitutional. Many of us ardently and intelligently have and continue to work towards a nuclear weapons-free world.
The B.C. Legislative Assembly recognized the aspirations of British Columbians by declaring our province nuclear weapons free in 1992 by a near-unanimous vote 51-1. Expiry of the Nanoose Bay lease is a practical opportunity to put that declaration into action.
In that time, numerous nuclear accidents involving military vessels worldwide have occurred, as cited in one proceeding submission after another yesterday and today . Fortunately, despite unknown habitat impacts, loss of human life has been contained and incidents have not resulted in a local reactor meltdown or escalated to an uncontrolled nuclear confrontation which might have unleashed the nuclear states arsenal of an estimated 70,000 nuclear warheads.
The federal governments unilateral seizure of 225 square kilometres of Georgia Strait in order for the U.S. Navy to continue to bring nuclear weapons into Nanoose Bay is an unprecedented step in Canadian history and an equally unprecedented misuse of federal power.
To do so, is to make Canadian citizens foreigners in our own land as American military interests are placed ahead of our rights and well-being.
The current expropriationary conduct of the federal government is a blatant reversal of its oft-repeated policy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and clearly points to how this government has lost its moral compass when faced with the "nuclear challenge" on its own doorstep.
Members of the Caucus care deeply about the environment of this region and believe that the continuation of weapons testing and passage of nuclear ships through our waters is detrimental to the health of the marine ecosystem and dangerous for the human inhabitants of the Georgia Basin. The Caucus contends that the continued nuclear sea-based arms race presents a serious threat to world peace. The Caucus regards the policy of foreign nuclear navies to "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons onboard while visiting Canadian ports and traversing Canadian waters and Canada's complicity to allow it, grossly undemocratic and a negligent lack of "due diligence."
We therefore urge the government of Canada to:
Here ends my formal objection on behalf of the BCEN Water Caucus. The remaining remarks are personal.
The Nanoose expropriation question is not a parochial environmental or community health concern. It is an international human rights issue. It is a women rights issue. It is a children rights issue. It is an issue of an independent Canada. It is an issue of planetary survival.
Since 1965, the U.S. navy's underwater nuclear warfare-testing program at CFMETR has tested air, ship, and submarine-launched torpedoes, deploying almost 5,000 weapons.
My work with First Nations in B.C. has taught me great respect for the wisdom gleaned from personal experience and the wealth of anecdotal traditional knowledge retained in so many communities. May I share a story or two of my own:
Over lunch in 1996, retired U.S. submarine commander Captain James Bush made the admission to myself and others, upon surfacing at Nanoose Bay his sub routinely discharged radioactive primary coolant into the Bay. Of course, at such time he would never have officially confirmed nor denied such a practice. Recent Objectors have highlighted that it is the policy of the U.S. Navy to deceitfully characterize any publicly disclosed incidents as "non-nuclear event." Bush also spoke of military engagements which led to crises which few civilians will ever learn about. He spoke candidly of one incident when he was surrounded by warships while infiltrating Russian waters -- had the other navy not fortunately withdrawn a nuclear engagement would have surely ensued - he reported he had orders to "come up shooting." This incident, like many accidents retold at this hearing never fully saw the light of day. Bush also spoke of how no major American city would ever routinely permit these "Floating Chernobyls" into their ports, fearing a reactor meltdown. He couldn't speak when pressed however, of the many episodes and accidents which remain classified to this day for so-called reasons of American national security.
Why does a man, who once could have single-handedly launched WWIII now view his government's nuclear policy so contemptuously? What does he know - yet is gagged from telling the world, under penalty of prison or worse?
No one would be na‹ve to think an American sub commander in Canadian waters would share the nuke launch codes with the local Canadian naval commander. However, how many realize no Canadian naval personnel are permitted to officially track American sub activities in the Strait of Georgia nor will ever receive invitation to undertake joint maneuvers "aboard" a U.S. sub during testing at Nanoose Bay? If Canadians currently stationed at Canadian Forces bases Comox or Nanoose were free to speak their minds they would speak of how Canada has surrendered her sovereignty to foreign nuclear forces.
We must ask who's country's security and sovereignty is served by Nanoose Bay? Where is the "self-defence" of Canada when we stand to be the first victims of a nuclear accident or draw ourselves by association into nuclear proliferation and potentially nuclear war? Who believes DND assurances of low radiological risk from nuclear-propelled vessels carrying nuclear weapons when the potential loser might be one quarter or more of the population of British Columbia and to this day Environment Canada is barred from sediment sampling the torpedo range and underwater munitions dump?
The cancellation of the Nanoose Treaty could have done much to advance progressive disarmament and spark a new round of nuclear arms control talks. Yet it has been shown once again that federal leadership is not up to facing the real or imagined threat of economic repression from the United States and despite the sentiment of a majority of Canadians refuses to affirm a strong "no-nukes" policy be they on land, air, or sea.
Our involvement in NATO and its recent failure to find peaceful means to bear to solve hostilities in the Balkans demonstrates how dangerous and unstable our lives become when tied to American foreign military interventions. How ironic that we would bomb to stop ethnic cleansing yet we harbor weapons that if used would cleanse the planet of all life.
If we cannot say "No" to nuclear weapons, how will we be able to say "No" to the testing of other weapons of mass destruction -- be they chemical, viral, biogenetic or space-based nukes? Perhaps our federal government is being consistent and has permitted such testing in secret facilities and testing grounds elsewhere in our country? Perhaps Nanoose Bay is not the only foreign military occupation in British Columbia?
I teach my daughters zero tolerance for violence. How do I explain to them Canada's role in international nuclear-feuding? How do I explain to their young minds that human sacrifice, duelling, the gas chambers and ovens and legitimized slavery were abominations yet the indiscrimate slaughter by a Whiskey-Golf calibrated nuclear warhead will lend credibility to Canadian foreign policy? How do I explain to them Canada's role in the prosecution of Serbian war crimes when Canada is an auxiliary of the nuclear fist of the United States?
The nuclear doctrine in a post Cold War world is the doctrine of the bully. It intensifies the proliferation of nuclear states as we've recently seen in Pakistan and India. It intensifies the creation of a new generation of nuclear weapons as we've seen in China. It intensifies the lawlessness and unlimited force of the United States.
I have personally witnessed the bloodied bodies of adults and children in the Middle East and Latin America due to America's hegemonic form of world order bolstered by its nuclear madness over humankind. It is these faces that haunt me as I tuck in my little ones each night, as I ask myself whether my taxes are protecting my children or endangering them as they sleep.
So where is the solution to expropriation and ultimately state-sponsored violence? Examples abound.
Canada once had a flawless international record of peacekeeping and delivering relief and sanctuary to the oppressed and downtrodden. We should earnestly strive to recapture that reputation.
I and others in this room today have marched miles and engaged in peaceful sit-ins at Nanoose. We have tried to visit and console Israeli nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunnu who still rots in solitary confinement. We have known and supported American political prisoners who have spent years in jail for simply seeding corn at US missile silos and swimming in front of Trident submarines. Many of us struggled against the Vietnamese, Cuban, Salvadoran and Nicaraguan invasions. We have orchestrated million dollar relief for Iraqi, Palestinian and Latin American children. We have long supported aboriginal justice in B.C. Many of us have been jailed for living out the "Canadian way" of nonviolent resistance to social and environmental injustice.
We are ordinary Canadians in the last months of this century, unwilling to be participants in the destruction of international principles of peace, security and justice. We are the 2600 right-minded objectors which come before this Hearing and before the Canadian government to demand better.
The Nanoose Bay Treaty is bad for my children and bad for your children. It is bad for British Columbia and Canada. It is bad for the world. Appeasement to nuclear tyranny or complicity so that our corporations might prosper is an obscene justification for moral and political cowardice.
The U.S. nuclear navy must go. It is non-negotiable. It must compensate us for the clean up. Prime Minister Chretien must stand up for Canada. Expropriation must be abandoned. Or invite mass outrage and protests in September.
We must pledge to starve the appetite of the monstrous global war machine and feed the world's hungry. We must denounce taking a willing role in the nuclear conspiracy which risks the lives of millions.
Ultimately, Canada must denounce all mass life-taking by the modern military state. To do otherwise, is to curse our god, our country and our children.
In conclusion, Mr. Goldie as a former jurist you are well aware that there are crimes of commission and omission. In my view it would be a gross omission if two individuals uch as ourselves stood by and did nothing to actively resist the foreign nuclear testing and warmaking at Nanoose Bay. I therefore implore you to report on this Hearing in good conscience and tell the Attorney General that you cannot personally support the federal expropriation of CFMETR Nanoose Bay.
Thank you.
Howard Breen
S10 C30
Gabriola Island, B.C.
VOR 1XO
(250) 247-7467
HBreen@Island.Net
Victoria Peace Centre
Box 8307, Victoria, BC, V8W 3R9, CANADA
(250) 592-8307 phone/fax
centre@vicpeace.ca
www.vicpeace.ca
Hello, my name is Kealey Pringle, and I am speaking here today on behalf of the Victoria Peace Centre. I was the staff person of the Victoria Peace Centre from 1992 until 1994 and have continued as a board member.
I have a deep-rooted sense of responsibility to my community and to society, which is why I am here today.
The Victoria Peace Centre has been around since 1983 and its members have been active in the peace movement going back to the 1950s.
The first Peace Walk, known now as the Earth Walk: Peace, Earth and Justice, was held in 1982 and is still going strong with several thousand people turning out every year.
I object for reasons of environmental, public safety, sovereignty, and economic concerns with the expropriation proposal.
The Victoria Peace Centre objects to the expropriation of Nanoose because I see the presence of the base, the testing of torpedoes, the presence of nuclear reactors on vessels and the possibility of nuclear weapons on board vessels an infringement on our rights to a safe home in which to live in a sovereign nation.
On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It states, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."
I view the Government of British Columbia's call to disallow the passage of nuclear vessels congruent with their responsibility to govern. The duty of an elected body is to protect its citizens.
British Columbians do not want visits by nuclear vessels and therefore the elected bodies should reflect that view.
The federal government, in my view, is acting contrary to its' mandate. The presence of nuclear vessels does not protect the citizens of Canada - it endangers our lives and increases the likelihood of a potential accident, which could be catastrophic.
The Victoria Peace Centre has had a long-standing campaign to stop nuclear ship visits. Part of this has been the nuclear ship phone tree in which we alert people every day that there is a potential hazard of a visiting nuclear-capable ship (with these signs).
In the well-known Greenpeace published "Neptune Papers", there are 1,600 accidents from 1980-1989 by the US Navy. Comparable data is not available from other nuclear navies, given the size of the fleets a rough but conservative estimate would at least double the data provided by the US Navy, suggesting some 3,200 naval accidents occurred worldwide from 1980-1989, or almost one a day.
The USS Houston, a submarine that visited Victoria only a week ago, was the submarine used in the filming of the movie "The Hunt for Red October." The captain was relieved of his command after the submarine experienced several accidents, including one during the filming of the movie that resulted in the death of a civilian.
The aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, which has visited Victoria several times, spilled 330 gallons of mildly radioactive coolant water on 27 July, 1989 into the James River in Virginia. The aircraft carrier was not yet commissioned at this time.
Emergency preparedness for a nuclear accident in Canadian ports is inadequate to the scale of possible accidents. Last year Canada's Auditor General noted that most of his concerns expressed in his 1992 report on nuclear emergency preparedness had not been addressed.
Ultimately, the surest way to prevent any naval nuclear accident is to eliminate both naval nuclear weapons and naval nuclear reactors.
I was a director of the Vancouver Island Peace Society, which took the federal government to court in the summer of 1992 calling for an open public environmental review of nuclear ship visits to BC waters. We lost in court and the review has never taken place.
What David Anderson, and others, refer to as a review was a Department of Defence internal review, which did not include looking at nuclear issues.
We are well aware that there is no testing of nuclear weapons in Georgia Strait but the blank torpedoes being testing are destined to be filled with nuclear material and the ships testing them are often nuclear powered and nuclear capable.
In many bases in the United States and around the world the governments locally and nationally are choosing the alternative of conversion of military bases into civilian uses.
The Victoria Peace Centre embarked on a conversion project in 1993 in which I interviewed 22 people and hosted a one-day colloquium. People participating included retired military, military civilian union leaders, peace activists, city councillors, federal and provincial local representatives, economic development consultants, and academics.
I'll quote from the present Honourable David Anderson, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, interview, " There are more ways of achieving security than just having armed forces... We need to recognize we're moving into another era. We may not have armed forces of the traditional type in the future. It may mean we contribute to peace ourselves in different ways."
And from Douglas Roche, Canadian Senator and former Ambassador for Disarmament to the United Nations, and a former Member of Parliament for the Conservative Party of Canada, " The military budget has increased over the years and has created the condition of being overextended in military spending. Therefore, as a state we are not meeting the basic needs of the people."
The project concluded with a one-day. Shortly before the colloquium, in February of 1994, the federal government announced deep cuts of 8.400 civilian personnel. There was a real incentive for change.
The peace movement has seen the need for conversion for many years. The benefits to society include a more vibrant economy, a reduction in unemployment, and an increase in the standard of living and the security of a clean environment.
We live in a militarized society. This uses up much needed resources and has an adverse effect on the environment.
The post-Cold War debate has produced:
In the fall of 1996, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, requested a committee conduct a review of Canada's current nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy. Between February and June 1998 it heard directly from dozens of Canadians and groups representing thousands more, as well as from expert witnesses and politicians from the United States, Europe and South Asia.
As Admiral Stansfield Turner, a retired senior U.S. military officer and former head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) put it in September 1998:
"The argument for disarmament has grown stronger in recent years. Today more and more experts with experience in nuclear strategy - among them, Robert McNamara, former U.S. Secretary of Defense; Generals Andrew Goodpastor, Charles Horner, and Lee Butler, all former military commanders with nuclear responsibilities - are advocating disarmament."
And from General Lee Butler, United States Air Force, Retired in a submission of July 1998 states, "As you examine the vital question of how Canada... should align itself on the continuing role of nuclear weapons I encourage you ponder deeply the opportunity and the stakes at hand. My country is badly in need of a new moral compass on this issue. We have committed the fatal sin in public policy making of becoming cynical and arrogant with respect to decisions affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people. We have trivialized the likelihood that deterrence might fail, thus providing easy moral cover for ignoring the consequences. We have learned to live with a weapon that numbs our conscience and diminishes our humanity. We need to hear voices of reason, urging us to a higher standard of rectitude and global leadership. We await your call."
The Report states: "Despite its technical aspects, the challenge of moving toward the prohibition of nuclear weapons remains fundamentally political and moral. The Committee is convinced that Canada has the vision, talent and credibility to play a leading role in finally ending the nuclear threat overhanging humanity. Our goal entering the next millennium is a more secure and better world for all. We can think of no higher foreign policy imperative."
The British Columbian and Canadian public has tried on many occasions to express their views and concerns regarding the nuclear ship visits.
The 2,600 filed objections to this expropriation demonstrate this quite vividly. It was a tight time frame in which to file, a busy and the summer being a disjointed time of year and yet 2,600 people, including many representing organizations with thousands more people - filed objections.
Many people have told me that they meant to file but didn't get it done in time. Also, many other people would like to file objections to nuclear ship visits but feel unable to because of the political nature of this issue. Many people have told me they feel unable to sign a simple petition because they have a government job and are concerned about losing it or losing out on promotions.
I quote now from the Utne Reader in an article titled, Living with conviction in a cynical time, "We often think of social involvement as noble but impractical… We mistrust our own ability to make a difference. The magnitude of the issues at hand has led too many of us to conclude that social involvement isn't worth the cost."
I was in the BC Legislature in April of 1992 when the all-party vote of 51-1 was taken declaring BC nuclear weapons free. This had an important amendment that called on the federal government to hold an open public environmental review of nuclear ships.
More than 30,000 nuclear weapons still remain. The destructive power of this arsenal remains enormous - the equivalent of 500,000 nuclear bombs of the size that destroyed Hiroshima. The use of even a small fraction of these weapons would be a disaster unparalleled by anything experienced in the history of the human race.
A global network of over 1,400 organizations in over 75 countries is working to put nuclear abolition on the international agenda.
Fourteen million people in Japan alone have signed the petition.
Public opinion polls show over 80% support for a nuclear weapons convention in most NATO countries and nuclear weapon states, including the United States and United Kingdom.
In May 1999, 8,000 people joined together in the Hague to launch the Hague Appeal for Peace (HAP). Abolition 2000 held its Annual General Meeting immediately following and it was agreed to establish Global Abolition Days, March 1-8, 2000, as an international week of actions, education and lobbying for nuclear disarmament.
I am a mother of two wonderful children, Emerald and Kelt, who are with me here today. I also have many years teaching in daycare as an Early Childhood Educator.
If my children are at risk of hurting themselves, even when the chances are small - the risk is too great. I would never knowingly let my children be in any situation if I knew there was a chance they could be hurt seriously or killed.
The presence of nuclear ships is too big a risk and the consequences of an accident too great to continue to ignore the possibility and ignore the moral obligation to prevent an accident from occurring.
Children are being taught aggression and militarism from a very early age. Our society is using "might is right" to resolve conflicts. We all need to have vision for a more peaceful world in which conflicts are resolved without violence.
As a mother and as a concerned citizen of British Columbia, Canada and this beautiful planet I object to the expropriation of Nanoose because it allows the continued, unaccountable access of nuclear ships to BC waters.
In my opinion the federal government is not acting responsibly to governing the citizens of Canada and therefore should not have rights to the seabed at Nanoose.
I fully support the British Columbian government continuing to lay claim to this land and seabed and encourage us all to continue towards the dismantling of the base at Nanoose and working towards a conversion of our society away from militarism and towards life-sustaining, enhancing, productive endeavors.
Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security
July 20, 1999
I am pleased to be representing the Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security (PCDS) to express this organization's formal objection to the Government of Canada's intention to expropriate "those lands comprising part of the foreshore and of the bed of the Strait of Georgia" associated with the Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental and Test Ranges (CFMETR) in the Nanoose Bay area of British Columbia. We are in support of the point of principle related to the lands in question that was agreed upon by federal and provincial negotiators on May 9, 1999 which calls for "confirming that no nuclear warheads will be present at any time within the license area." This provision is consistent with a Legislative Assembly Resolution of April 23, 1992 declaring British Columbia a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. We further support the amendment to that same resolution which calls on the "Government of Canada to conduct a full public environmental review of the dangers involved by the presence of nuclear weaponed and nuclear powered vessels in British Columbia's harbours and waterways."
PCDS is an education, research and support network that has worked for peace in the Asia-Pacific region for the past 14 years. We maintain offices in Cardiff, near San Diego (California), Yokohama (Japan) and on Denman Island (British Columbia), the latter location in close proximity to the lands which are the subject of this hearing. Though I have lived in this region since 1970 and have concerns about my own personal security related to activities at Nanoose, I am today representing the security concerns of communities throughout the region with whom PCDS is associated. It is legitimate to ask: Why would communities in Fiji, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Okinawa, Thailand, Australia, Belau, the Philippines and even the United States have interest in an expropriation hearing about a portion of the seabed in the Strait of Georgia?
Issues which bare on this expropriation related to "safety or security of Canada or of a state allied with Canada" and "defence purposes," terms used in the Notice of Intention, have resonance in the Asia-Pacific. Many citizens in the region also challenge their governments on the activities of foreign militaries and their implications to the environment, human health and safety, democratic rights, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and regional and global security in general. Like Nanoose, many communities throughout the region play host to ship transits, port visits, homeporting, training exercises and other operations of the forward deployed United States naval forces, and in particular, U.S. nuclear naval forces, and in some cases the navies of other nuclear states. The degree to which the Government of Canada protects the interests of its citizens in proximity to such naval operations is of high interest to citizens in other countries who find themselves in similar circumstances to those of British Columbia's citizens.
At the outset, we wish to indicate our concern about procedures related to this expropriation. It is understood from the Notice of Intention that the reason for the expropriation is "for a purpose related to the safety or security of Canada or of a state allied or associated with Canada and it would not be in the public interest further to indicate that purpose." It appears that the Minister of Public Works and Government Services has invoked Section 5.3 of the Expropriation Act which provides for ministerial discretion to withhold information from the public related to the purposes of this expropriation. We believe that lack of full disclosure about the purposes of the expropriation on the grounds of national or allied security impedes the ability of citizens to argue that such expropriation is unwarranted. Rather than serving the "public interest" referred to in the Notice of Intention, withholding of information is contrary to the public interest and may compromise these proceedings. It is unacceptable, should expropriation be deemed reasonable by the Minister, that such expropriation may be based on information which cannot be disclosed and thus, not challenged by the public. I wish to note that narrowly defined national security and public interest are regularly invoked by governments around the Asia-Pacific as a means by which to deny citizens information to be able to assess costs/benefits and make informed recommendations to their governments on actions which, in democratic societies, are taken in their names.
Having made note of what we believe is a procedural failing of the expropriation process, we wish to comment on the "generic," though not well-defined, stated purpose of the expropriation -- that is, "the safety or security of Canada or of a state allied or associated with Canada." Public documents of the Government of Canada over the past few years, particularly those of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, indicate that the Government's working definition of "security" has shifted dramatically since the end of the Cold War and its policies reflect that change.
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has stated: "Our basic unit of analysis in security matters has shrunk from the state to the individual. This human security lens produces new priorities...These issues have now become the daily concern of foreign ministers and governments. They are the human security agenda" [Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1998 Foreign Policy Conference, October 16, 1998]. As recently as May 13, Mr. Axworthy quoted Vaclav Havel who observed: "The sovereignty of the community, the region, the nation, the state...makes sense only if it is derived from the one genuine sovereignty -- that is, from the sovereignty of the human being." In that same talk, Mr. Axworthy said: "...I believe that the concept of peace and security - national, regional and global -- makes sense only if it is derived from human security" [Message from The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, To the Hague Appeal for Peace, May 13, 1999].
The United Nations suggests that until recently, "...the concept of security has for so long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression or protection of national interests in foreign policy....forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards...Human security is not a concern with weapons -- it is a concern with human life and dignity" [UNDP Human Development Report 1994]. Canada has become an outspoken champion of this new understanding of security -- that is, human security based on the well being of individuals in their daily lives. Human security now drives Canada's relations with other nations and its activities in international fora. In fact, such a definition served as the primary rationale for the recent deployment of Canadian forces to Kosovo.
In these hearings, it is important to ask whether Canada's "human security agenda," is being equally applied here at home. When the Minister of Public Works and Government Services invokes national security as a reason to expropriate the lands in question as well as to craft the nature of these proceedings, we must ask: Has the Minister in fact applied his own government's revised understanding of "security" in this case? Although the Expropriation Act affords much latitude to the Minister, it would be expected that consistent with principles of administrative law, the Minister would have to have a reasonable basis upon which to form an opinion on both the procedure and outcome of this case. The current definition of national security employed by the Government of Canada in its public documents and policy decisions must necessarily apply in this case and guide the Minister in his deliberations. If the purpose of "security," and in 1999 we mean "human security" is not achieved in this case, expropriation is not warranted.
PCDS is of the opinion that the prerequisites of human security which include assurances about human health, environmental and social well-being, human and political rights including access to information and transparent democratic decision-making have never been applied in the case of the CFMETR. Should the expropriation proceed and "business as usual" operations continue at the site, the Government of Canada will continue in its historical failure to protect the security of the individuals who reside in the Georgia Basin, which now number 3 million. In the short time that I have, I will mention a few examples in which human security is compromised in this case. I will concentrate on nuclear issues as they have been identified by citizens in the Strait of Georgia, and in the Asia-Pacific region in general, as of highest priority.
To our knowledge, no independent nor comprehensive environmental and human health assessment of activities associated with CFMETR has occurred. The Department of Defence's "Environmental Assessment" (August, 1996), conducted almost 25 years after the establishment of the facility, acknowledges that, "the single largest social concern about CFMETR activities, without a doubt, is the presence of nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable warships." However, it then goes on to say that, "This issue is beyond the terms of the reference of this study." In a section entitled "Identification of Historical Issues of Public Concern," it is noted that, "The historical issues of public concern have been summarized by reviewing newspaper articles dating back to about 1965. The dominant issue over the years has been the presence of nuclear- powered and possibly nuclear-capable warships and submarines. The nuclear issue is not within the terms of reference of this environmental assessment..." Human security cannot said to be served when the most serious public concern for over a quarter of a century related to the lands in question at these hearings, has not been adequately addressed by the government who seeks expropriation today.
This compromise of human security, however, is not surprising. The U.S. nuclear navy and its allies around the region remain steadfastly secretive about nuclear navy operations and remain immune to independent public scrutiny. The public's right to know and give informed consent to the presence of nuclear navies in their communities remains frustrated. [We note for the record that even when nuclear considerations were eliminated from the terms of reference of DND's study, the study states: "Complete records of all CFMETR activities over its three decades of operation are not available. Reconstructing an accurate picture of CFMETR activities has been a challenge due to the limitation of record keeping in the early years, the confidential nature of some of the activities which have occurred on the ranges, and the split jurisdiction between the Canadian and U.S. armed forces." (our emphasis).]
As Dr. Jackson Davis who has authored a number of reports on this subject contends: "The policy of accepting port visits by nuclear capable and nuclear powered vessels has never been officially re-evaluated in light of the new costs associated with nuclear navies. Indeed, even within nuclear nations, the policy of stationing nuclear capable and nuclear powered vessels in densely populated urban ports has not been evaluated properly from a policy perspective. Siting even a single nuclear reactor in the middle of a densely populated urban center would be unthinkable under present regulatory regimes governing the commercial reactor industry of most nations. But as a consequence of the policy vacuum surrounding warship visits and military/civilian interactions in general, the siting of multiple nuclear reactors in large port cities, in the form of mobile naval propulsion reactors, is practiced routinely by the military. The policy has evolved without full public knowledge or participation, without detailed exploration of prospective costs, without consideration of the alternatives and -- in particular -- without full disclosure. Disclosure is especially important issue for democratic governments. Western nuclear navies, for example, following the U.S. lead, refuse as a matter of policy to divulge whether nuclear weapons are aboard their naval vessels, citing security concerns. The consequence is that the affected public and governments, in accepting port visits by nuclear vessels, also accept implicitly a risk which cannot be evaluated independently...Rational policy-making entails evaluating a particular activity with the aim of comparing the costs with the benefits. If the benefits outweigh the costs, the policy is by definition socially utilitarian; but if the costs outweigh the benefits, then by definition the policy is non-utilitarian and is in need of fundamental re-evaluation. Such a systematic comparison of costs and benefits has never been undertaken (publicly) by any government in connection with either the stationing of nuclear vessels in home ports or the acceptance of port visits by the nuclear vessels of allied nations" [Nuclear Accident Aboard a Military Vessel Berthed in Japanese Ports: Quantitative Analysis of Hypothetical Accident Scenarios for Yokosuka, Sasebo and Kure, W. Jackson Davis, Environmental Studies Institute, Santa Cruz, June 1988].
The democratic process -- a critical component of human security -- is jeopardized by lack of disclosure and independent scrutiny about the nuclear navy and its operations and is evident in a number of documents. I note a few of these for the record: In terms of naval nuclear propulsion:
The "Statement by United States Government on Operation of U.S. Nuclear-Powered Warships in Foreign Ports (Revised 1964)" specifies that "The United States Government does not make technical information on the design or operation of its nuclear-powered warships available to host governments in connection with port entry." [Cited in Davis]
Canadian government documents obtained through Access to Information during Canada's quest to procure its own nuclear submarines (based on a U.S. reactor design) were highly censored. For example, a lengthy document entitled, "Nuclear Option Study, Nuclear Safety/Regulatory Team, Phase II - Final Report, 30 January 1987," had excisions ranging from a paragraph to eight pages including on such topics as "Radiological Safety," "Environmental Issues," "Nuclear Emergency Preparedness," and "Submarine Safety."
This same lack of public information is evident in the ongoing efforts of the U.S. navy to homeport Nimitz-class aircraft carriers in San Diego. The Navy's Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (1995) censored the entire appendix which contained the technical information on nuclear reactors as well as analyses of postulated accidents. The EIS noted: "Because nuclear propulsion technology is among the most sensitive military technologies possessed by the United States, Congress has placed stringent limitations on foreign access under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (amended) and other Federal statutes."
In other jurisdictions, such as Australia, the Australian Department Defence told a Senate hearing on visits of nuclear powered or armed vessels (1988) that its "access to naval nuclear reactor information is limited," and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization (ANSTO) testified that, "We have, at best, very limited access to restricted information from the countries operating nuclear warships...."
Even the Government of Canada which is seeking expropriation here today has indicated that the information from allies and the historical record on these subjects may be wanting. On October 30, 1991, the federal government announced measures regarding the passage through Canadian waters of nuclear propelled and nuclear weapons-capable allied vessels. An accompanying DND document said: "Though all potential impacts were judged not significant, much of the data provided to support these conclusions comes from our allies and the historical record. It was decided in 1990 to update the assessments for NPV/NCV visits. Further, in compliance with the Green Plan, an environmental review of the current policy of permitting these visits is being carried out in concert with the harbour assessments. Therefore, all the potential impacts discussed herein will be subject to further in-depth study to confirm the analysis and, if necessary, to develop better plans and procedures to ensure that the safest conditions always prevail" [Summary of Findings: Environmental Assessment of Policy, DND, October 30, 1991].
Related to a potential nuclear propulsion accident, during New Zealand's Special Committee Hearings on Nuclear Propulsion (1992), a U.S. navy document entitled, "OPNAVINST 3040.5B," was revealed by Dr. Peter Wills. According to Wills, the document suggests that commanders don't necessarily need to contact all the relevant authorities, like a foreign government, when a nuclear powered vessel has an accident in a foreign port. The document expresses concern about public reaction in the event of even a minor accident and the serious impact that this could have on the operation of U.S. Navy nuclear powered warships throughout the world.
In terms of nuclear weapons, the same secrecy prevails:
The tired vestige of the Cold War, the U.S. "Neither Confirm Nor Deny" policy regarding the presence of nuclear weapons still persists, though in a modified form. It reads: "It is general U.S. policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, attack submarines and naval aircraft. However, we do not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines or aircraft" [Pacific Research, Australian National University, August 1992]. Although it may be unlikely that such weapons are aboard the classes of U.S. vessels that frequent Nanoose, even given the directives of former President Bush that removed nuclear weapons from most U.S. vessels and the modified "NCND" policy, citizens still do not have absolute technical assurance that nuclear weapons are not carried into British Columbia by U.S. naval vessels.
It is also noted that although Tomahawk nuclear cruise missiles have been removed from U.S. navy vessels, some portion of these have been retained and are stored ashore in the United States for redeployment if necessary for "contingencies" -- contingencies that have not been publicly well-defined by the United States. This means that nuclear cruise missiles could find their way back to B.C. ports under certain circumstances.
As well, ballistic missile submarines, which have occasionally visited Nanoose, remain a critical leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad and "can carry nuclear weapons" as confirmed by the Canadian navy [Capt. DJM Marshall, Esquimalt Base Commander, Safety of Nuclear Propelled Vessels and Nuclear Emergency Response, 23 March 1998].
And although the Cold War is over, the United States maintains tenacious hold on its nuclear weapons and they remain the cornerstone of U.S. strategic policy for the "indefinite future." Although the Clinton Administration has jettisoned its directive that the military must be prepared to win a protracted nuclear war, it retains numerous options for the use of nuclear weapons, including their first use. The retention of the option of nuclear weapons use means the retention of the option of redeploying them on various classes of U.S. naval vessels. Therefore, although B.C. ports and waters may be "nuclear weapons-free" at the moment, consistent with U.S. policy, this status is not confirmed and could change at any time.
Such secrecy may prevail even in the event of a nuclear weapons accident. In another naval instruction which we believe remains current, on-scene commanders are instructed as follows: "If possible, the accident or significant incident should be treated as an accident or incident involving conventional high explosives"...and to, "Recover or remove, if at all practicable, all evidence of the nuclear weapon accident or significant incident as expeditiously as possible." If the presence of nuclear weapons is denied, public affairs officers are also instructed that: "A denial should characterize the accident or incident as a nonnuclear event" [USCINCPACINST S8110.4C 08 May 1984] "Admitting that a nuclear weapon accident has occurred in a host nation or even at-sea would severely damage American strategic access to Pacific ports" [Nuclear Transit, Accidents, and Consultation in the Pacific, Peter Hayes, Walden Bello and Peter Willis, October 1987].
The pervasive lack of disclosure is compounded by the lack of comprehensive civilian emergency response plans and compensation regimes in the event of a nuclear reactor or weapons accident. Certainly, human security cannot be considered as having been served in conditions such as these. Interestingly, the environmental study prepared for DND in 1996 concedes that, "Given the perceived risk from CFMETR activities and the presence of foreign warships, foreign weapons and foreign navigational hazards in Canadian waters, it is reasonable for Canadian citizens to ask how their rights would be protected should an accident with a foreign vessel occur, and how fair compensation would be obtained from a foreign government. Procedures do exist in Canadian and international law for dealing with these situations. Whether or not these procedures would work for private citizens or small boat operators needs clarification."
When considering expropriation, besides determining if the purposes that supposedly justify the expropriation are achieved -- that is, national security -- and we contend they are not, we believe potential expropriation should also take into consideration continuing need of existing use and availability of alternatives. The Department of Defence's own "Environmental Assessment" (1996) notes that, "Due to budget restraint on both sides of the border and a decrease in the perceived submarine threat, the use of the ....ranges is expected to decline to about 30% of the available range hours, or to less than half of historical records." Coupled with this, it is noted that since the 1960s when CFMETR was established, Nanaimo (characterized as one of the fastest growing regions in North America in the DND study) has experienced in excess of a 700% population increase and other residential communities in proximity to CFMETR are experiencing annual growth rates of 3-8%. Although we do not support the transfer of the risks associated with some activities of CFMETR to other locations, in terms of alternatives, the same DND study reports "...several other sites exist in North America and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to support a board spectrum of systems test and fleet operations." Given reduced need, the unsuitability of the area for military testing given increased populations, and the availability of alternatives, expropriation may not be warranted to accommodate continued existing use of the lands in question.
Finally, we wish to discuss impacts on global security. Even without being armed with nuclear weapons themselves at any given time, attack submarines which use the Nanoose range are a critical component of the U.S. military strategy, a strategy with nuclear weapons at its core. The Government of Canada has recognized the threat to human security of weapons of mass destruction and the policies which develop and deploy them. It has said that, "The more nuclear weapons there are and the more states that possess them, the greater the threat of nuclear catastrophe, accidental or deliberate." Given that the federal government has called for the elimination of such weapons, to continue to aid and abet the development of elements of strategies that involve their use seems at cross purposes. Apparently, the B.C. Legislative Assembly recognized this fundamental contradiction in the federal government's position and, in its wisdom, declared this province to be a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and called for a full public environmental review of the dangers of the presence of naval nuclear weapons and reactors in British Columbia.
The democratic vote in the B.C. Legislature with a 51-1 majority is interesting in the context of concerns that have been voiced about Nanoose and Canada's commitments to its allies, and has resonance far across the Pacific. I quote the former Prime Minister of New Zealand, Rt. Hon J.B. Bolger who said, "It is regrettable that a democratic decision taken by the New Zealand people - to adopt a non-nuclear policy - is not viewed by the United States government for what it is. Our nuclear free policy is not intended as an affront to our American allies, but as a democratic expression of New Zealanders' respect for their environment" [Address by Rt. On. J.B. Bolger, Prime Minister of New Zealand, American Chamber of Commerce in New Zealand, 8 June 1993].
We would ask that the Government of Canada understand that British Columbia's declaration of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the PCDS objection to this expropriation are democratic expressions of our respect for the environment and those who inhabit it, be it the Strait of Georgia, the vast waters of the Pacific or the planet as a whole. We request that the Minister of Public Works and Government Services recommend against expropriation of these "lands" in favour of the Government of Canada.
Nanoose Hearings: ''KEEP ALL YOUR NUKES AT HOME''.
Victoria Raging Grannies
KEEP ALL YOUR NUKES AT HOME
[ sung to the tune of: ''BACK WITH THE OLD FOLKS AT HOME'' ]
ALL UP AND DOWN THE WORLD'S GREAT OCEANS
SUBMARINES ROAM,
STILL SEARCHING FOR A NUCLEAR HAVEN,
SOMEWHERE THAT'S CLOSE TO HOME.
NO ONE WILL ACCEPT THE STRANGER,
EVERY PORT IS BARRED.
WHO WANTS TO BE A NUCLEAR TARGET,
PLEASE, NOT IN OUR BACK YARD.
THEY'RE NOT ALLOWED IN SEATTLE,
NEW YORK OR L.A.
SPAIN, ITALY AND OKINAWA
TOLD THEM TO GO AWAY.
NOW B.C. SAYS ''WE DON'T WANT THEM''
OTTAWA SAYS ''WE DO''.
IF OUR NEIGHBOUR WANTS TO BLOW THE BIG ONE,
WE'VE GOT TO BLOW UP, TOO.
SOME OF US CAN STILL REMEMBER
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR.
U.S. MISSILES GOT THE BOOT FROM COMOX.
WE THOUGHT THEY WERE GONE FOR SURE.
IF UNINVITED GUESTS KEEP COMING
TELL THEM TO VAMOOSE.
WHO CARES IF DAVID ANDERSON LOVES 'EM
WE DON'T WANT 'EM IN NANOOSE
........by Alison Acker, Raging Granny, Victoria, BC
Victoria Raging Grannies dedicate the following ditty to the American aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis which arrives in Victoria on Wednesday, July 21, 1999. This aircraft carrier is powered by two nuclear reactors. Its captain will neither confirm or deny if there are nuclear bombs on board.
We have invited the Stennis captain Douglas R. Roulstone to tea ''and a chat regarding matters of safety and mutual concern.'' Should he or another US navy officer turn up, we'll report what he has to say.
THEY'RE CARRYING NUCLEAR BOMBS
[ sung to the tune of John Brown's Body; or, Glory, Glory Hallelujah! ]
Every now and then the U.S. nuclear ships drop by.
They're crewed by lovely fellows who would never hurt a fly.
But each of them could blow British Columbia sky high
'cause they're carrying ... nuclear ... bombs.
They're here ... for rest and recreation,
They're here ... for rest and recreation
They're here ... for rest and recreation
But we cannot sleep in peace.
It's kind of Bill to send his ships so we can get a date.
With love boats coming into port, we too might find a mate.
But if they bring their toys along, we'd really rather wait --
'cause they're carrying ... nuclear ... bombs.
They're here ... for rest and recreation,
They're here ... for rest and recreation
They're here ... for rest and recreation
But we cannot sleep in peace.
If you like living dangerously, call the base command.
Dial 363-2397 to get yourself a man.
But please remember, ladies, that there's no emergency plan
when they're carrying ... nuclear ... bombs.
They're here ... for rest and recreation,
They're here ... for rest and recreation
They're here ... for rest and recreation
But we cannot sleep in peace.
Afterword
July 29 1999
Given the American claim to the missile test site at Nanoose Bay, on Vancouver Island, is it possible that they are preparing to take it by force? Or are they using the ''big stick'' as intimidation?
Not only is the gigantic nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Stennis (CVN74) here in Victoria but just minutes ago the USS Asheville (SSN758), a Los Angeles class attack nuclear-powered submarine arrived.
Betty Brightwell,
Raging Granny
Presentation to the Public Hearing on Nanoose Bay Expropriation
on behalf of the
Vancouver Island Public Interest Research Group (VIPIRG)
and the
Barnard-Boecker Centre Foundation (BBCF)
Co-written by Stacy Chappel (VIPIRG) and Theresa Wolfwood (BBCF)
Presented July 26, 1999
Nanaimo, British Columbia
VIPIRG PO Box 3035 Stn CSC, SUB Rm. B122 University of Victoria, V8W 3P3 BBCF 1022 McGregor, Victoria BC, V8S 3T9
My name is Stacy Chappel, I'm the Executive Director of the Vancouver Island Public Interest Research Group (VIPIRG) and I co-wrote this presentation with Theresa Wolfwood. Theresa is a member of the Board of VIPIRG, and President of the Barnard-Boecker Centre Foundation. Theresa and I have both been active in peace movements for a number of years, and Theresa was a member of the panel for the People's Enquiry into the Implications of the Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental and Test Ranges in Nanoose Bay in 1985.
We vehemently oppose the expropriation of the Nanoose testing ranges, Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental and Test Ranges (CFMETR), by the federal government on the following grounds:
1. Expropriation of CFMETR does not serve the public interest, but rather serves the interests of the military industrial complex, the sex trade, and multinational corporations.
2. The Cold War has ended, and the "justification" for NATO's existence as a military alliance has ended, along with it the supposed "necessity" for US testing ranges like CFMETR on Canadian territory.
3. The military and multinational corporations involved in the military industry are operating outside of the laws which govern the citizens of this province and this country, and this undermines the power and efficacy of Canadian democracy. Specifically, nuclear ships that come to CFMETR operate outside of Canadian environmental laws.
4. The ecological, economic, democratic and safety risks to the communities surrounding Nanoose, and on the sailing routes of the nuclear vessels, far outweigh any benefits that the CFMETR could possibly offer to these communities.
Canada's Department of National Defence argues that the Nanoose testing range is a vital part of Canada's North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) commitment. Surely we must ask ourselves whether this commitment remains relevant in a post-cold war era. Does the Canadian public wish to continue supporting NATO now that its original mandate has expired? There has been no effort to determine the public will on this matter, no public debate, no inquiry, and no referendum. Surely such an effort would be necessary before taking a drastic measure like the expropriation of provincial territory on behalf of NATO activities.
Beyond the question of relevance of NATO's historical goals lies the question of NATO's emerging goals. The Pentagon has clearly stated its intent to use NATO to further US power globally. On March 8, 1992, The New York Times quoted extensively from a Pentagon document titled, "The Defense Planning Guide."
Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival…. First, the US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.
We must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.
The document goes on to explicitly state the Pentagon's view of NATO's role in this plan:
It is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defence and security as well as the channel for US influence and participation in European security affairs … We must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO.
Canada's most recent involvement with NATO has been, of course, the war against Yugoslavia. When examining our participation in NATO, Canadians should consider that many thoughtful and well-informed people, including Canada's former ambassador to Yugoslavia, international observer to Bosnia, Roland Keith, and the Lawyers for Social Justice, among others, concluded that NATO was violating international law in its attack. Multinational and Military interests vs. Public interests
Global economic power of corporations is often linked to military expansion. Corporations have become involved in the effort to expand NATO, due to their interest in marketing their military products.
Corporate support for the NATO summit [in Washington for NATO's 50th Anniversary] is an outgrowth of the active role many US companies, particularly defence contractors such as Lockheed Martin Corp. of Bethesda, have played in the move to enlarge NATO beyond it's traditional US-Western Europe axis. US Defence companies lobbied hard in [US] Congress in recent years to admit the former Soviet satellites Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.
"Companies like Lockheed Martin, for example, and all of them were active with me overseas," said former congressman Gerald B. H. Solomon, who headed a House task force appointed by former House speaker Newt-Gingrich to push the membership issue.
Solomon, now a private lobbyist, said he travelled throughout Eastern and Central Europe spreading the message that if the United States was going to be NATO's principal military power, supplying most of its high-tech weaponry, then U.S. defence firms should receive contracts to rearm the former Soviet states .
Global agreements enacted in Canada, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, and those proposed and advocated by our federal government, like the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), protect the subsidisation and financing of national military industries even while they restrict such subsidies for other industries. This creates a situation where the military industries become the only option for government subsidies in job creation or national investment. The MAI draft agreement states that "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed … to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests: … (iii) relating to the production of arms and ammunition" .
Just as corporate involvement in military agreements has increased, so has corporate involvement in our trade agreements. While corporations have won the legal status of "persons" in Canada, actual persons-Canadian citizens-have little political lobbying power compared to influential corporate groups like the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) and corporate think tanks like the CD Howe Institute .
These problems are not limited to the issue of Nanoose Bay. Canada is a nuclear colony of the US military-mining and supplying uranium and depleted uranium for weaponry, as well as providing testing grounds for those weapons--and accepting nuclear waste for "storage" in our territory. (See Appendix I)
Of course, the separation of military and industry has always been a false one. In fact, the military is one of the world's top industries, and therefore one of the sectors with the largest clout in the political arena.
The federal government exempts the US Navy from Canada's environmental laws.
US warships do not have to report oil spills like the three-mile long slick trailing behind the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Nimitz when it cruised into Nanoose in 1995. And each time a US sub fires a torpedo at … CFMETR … it leaves behind lead, copper and other toxic metals in prime salmon habitat. Canada's environmental minister has exempted US warships from that law as well .
Raphael Girade, Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, in a public talk at Camosun College on June 9, 1999, stated that Canadian soldiers were not under Canadian command while working for NATO in Yugoslavia. Indeed, he said that Canada was excluded from the commanding body, despite our wish to participate.
When defence contractors wield economic power and heavy influence over government, and are the sole industry that can receive government subsidy, public interests in controlling military might and promoting peace are seriously diminished. When the military-based corporations participate in influential lobby groups like the BCNI, and the military itself wins exemptions from the laws governing other industries and Canadian citizens, the military industrial complex begins to operates as its own ungoverned and unquestionable body.
When foreign militaries on our territory, and Canadian soldiers under foreign command, are exempted from the democratic controls of our nation's parliamentary and legal systems, the often touted remark that 'the military serves to protect the democratic interests of the citizens' is exposed as a great lie.
-Barbara Klunder "Broken Record" Megatons: Cartoonists Against Nuclear War
The expropriation of Nanoose for US military purposes is one part of this great lie. Indeed, what has happened to the April 23, 1992 motion, democratically passed in the British Columbia Legislature, that made British Columbia a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone? What will become of our participation in these hearings?
Public protest of testing at CFMETR, as well as public participation in this hearing, represents more than a mere call to cease the federal government's expropriation proceedings. We are also demanding that democratic control of our communities, our province, and our country be put back into the hands of the public.
War. What is it good for? It's good for business.
- Billy Bragg.
Whose interests are served when the federal government of Canada expropriates the Nanoose testing range and hands it to the US with a multi-year lease?
The citizens of BC do not benefit-not democratically, not ecologically, and not economically.
The exemption of US military from the rule of law, the choice to ignore BC's Nuclear Weapon Free status, and the heavy influence of corporate military interests over our government, show that the public interest and democracy are not served by furthering US use of Canadian territory for their military testing.
Environmentally, no argument can be made on CFMETR's behalf. The Canadian Department of National Defence's own study in 1995 showed that the sea bed at Nanoose Bay has had "93,000 kilometres of copper wire, and 2,200 tons of lead, lithium batteries, smoke flares, sonobuoy entrails and other toxic materials" dumped on it by the US Navy .
Although MP David Anderson may argue that there is an economic benefit to Nanoose from CFMETR's operation, Dr. Jack Ruitenbeek of the University of Victoria has shown otherwise. He conducted a standard cost benefit analysis of CFMETR that showed a net loss of $8,000,000 annually to the Canadian taxpayer.
Perhaps Anderson and Ruitenbeek have such different economic forecasts because our federal MP is adding some additional profits to his calculations-the profits made in the sex trade. Our city leaders in Victoria loudly proclaim their love for the tourist dollar spent during visits of US Navy ships to Victoria en route to Nanoose. Indeed, many legitimate businesses do profit from these visits. However, there remains a silence about the increased prostitution in our community. The increase in business for the sex trade is no secret to anyone who has been downtown Victoria on an evening during Naval visits.
An interesting comparison could be made to Subic Bay, on the island of Northern Luzon in the Philippines. Subic Bay, until 1991, was also the site of a US Naval base and testing range. The US Naval presence was the undeniable cause, and sustenance, of a huge prostitution industry. Anyone who has visited Subic Bay since will tell you that there is not much left to that community except the sex trade now that the US Naval base has closed. What was that base adding to the local economy?
So, what are the benefits of expropriating Nanoose for continued testing by the US Navy? Whose interests are being served? Only the interests of those who benefit when public democratic power is decreased. Only the interests of those who benefit from decreased public control of military activities-including the activities of foreign militaries on Canadian territory. Only the interests of those who benefit when environmental protection is eliminated. Only those whose interests are served by a dramatically increased market for prostitution.
In short, those who benefit include no one who has to live with the safety, environmental, health and economic risks posed by the continuing operation of this base.
In examination of this issue from the perspective of the public interest, we can find no reasonable justification for the appropriation of Nanoose for continued military purposes. We therefore demand on democratic, economic, environmental, safety, and ethical grounds:
1. that the plans to expropriate Nanoose be ceased immediately.
2. that CFMETR be closed and replaced with an operation that creates economic, democratic, environmental, safety and moral benefit to the community.
3. that the millions of dollars saved annually by the closure of CFMETR be redirected to funding this project.
4. that the US Navy be immediately required to clean up the sea bed of Nanoose
5. that all exemption from Canadian law given to foreign or Canadian military be repealed.
6. that the Canadian military budget be cut in order to provide funding for programs providing true democratic, environmental, and economic benefit
7. that a democratic public inquiry into Canada's participation in NATO be convened.
We believe that Nanoose Bay must remain in the possession of the rightful owners, the people of British Columbia and that the closing of this base will be a major step in the regaining and strengthening of democracy in Canada. We hope that these hearings will be a part of a true democratic process, where the public interest is still of primary concern to our government. In that spirit of hope, we would like to close with a poem by Dorothy Livesay.
Bellhouse Bay
Last night a full silver moon
shone in the waters of the bay
so serene
one could believe in
an ongoing universe
And today it's summer
noon heat soaking into
arbutus trees blackberry bushes
Today in the cities
rallies and peace demonstrations exhort
SAVE OUR WORLD SAVE OUR CHILDREN
But save also I say
the towhees under the blackberry bushes
eagles playing a mad caper
in the sky above Bellhouse Bay
This is not paradise
dear adam dear eve
but it is a rung on the ladder
upwards
towards a possible
breathaking landscape
-Dorothy Livesay
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Victoria Peace Centre